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The Threat of Traditional Attacks and Cyber Warfare on Natural Gas and Coal 
(Under the direction of Dr. Shapour Vossoughi) 
 
 Herein, I will focus on the critical infrastructural security of the gas and coal 
industries, which account for 50% of our nations domestic energy consumption. I believe that 
maintaining energy security is a fundamental responsibility because it ensures the well being of 
our society. Our ability to maintain critical infrastructural security is dependent on public 
awareness and support of our critical infrastructure, and to understand the risks that threaten it. In 
addition, effective government leadership in response to terrorist attacks, private sector 
cooperation, planning for emergencies that involve supply disruptions, and ensuring adequate 
resource allocation to provide energy source diversification can ensure infrastructural security. 
The objectives of infrastructural security cannot be achieved without the means of innovative 

























Over the past two centuries, the United States has responded to numerous attacks 
deliberately intended to test our resolve and exploit our vulnerabilities with destructive prejudice. 
Despite the pain that results from these challenges, precious data can be taken from the lessons 
they impart, which can help formulate an adaptive and strategic response to future challenges 
that lie over the horizon. Our resiliency can be measured by our capacity to respond to crises; 
therefore, it is imperative to our national and economic security that we establish the defense 
mechanisms necessary to secure our energy resources. These mechanisms must be both 
institutional and industrialized. They must be robust, redundant, and capable of a rapid response 
to disruptions in our affected infrastructural sectors. In terms of our national security, the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2013 (NIPP 2013) addresses various infrastructural 
sectors, including agriculture and food systems, defense industrial base, energy systems, public 
health and health care facilities, national monuments and icons, banking and finance systems, 
drinking water systems, chemical facilities, commercial facilities, dams, emergency services, 
nuclear power systems, information technology systems, telecommunication systems, postal and 
shipping services, transportation systems, and government facilities.  
Inextricable Interdependencies 
Many of the sectors mentioned in NIPP 2013 are interconnected. Our ability to respond 
to attacks can be measured by how effectively we identify and mitigate single points of failure 
that may pose risk to these sectors during their operational process. A successful attack on our 
energy sector that damages our ability to generate power would result in a cascading effect of 
disastrous proportions because energy is a lifeline system that supports each sector, where each 
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sector influences each other both directly and indirectly. Natural gas and coal are used to 
generate energy in the power generation stations, which further provide this energy to processing 
stations, storage facilities, and natural gas and coal distribution systems. These inter-dependent 
relationships are indisputable! 
Information Technology and Operational Technology Convergence 
Power plant operators can continuously monitor and control different sections of a plant 
to ensure its proper operation, which is possible because of the development of remote command 
and control networking technology. Information technology (IT) and operational technology 
(OT) allow wireless exchange of data between various systems. IT systems compute the data 
integrated with the OT systems to monitor and control the operational processes occurring in a 
power plant. The interconnected IT and OT networks result in synergies that enhance the energy 
industry. However, because of the automation of several of the industrial processes, the gas and 
coal companies should manage their cybersecurity approach to protect the automated controls 
that manage processing and production. Understanding the systems and subsystems that 
encompass this integration is essential to grasp the fundamental concept related to the manner in 
which the industrial networking platforms enable energy production from gas and coal. 
Enterprise Applications  
Enterprise applications include various systems such as SAP and Oracle. SAP is an 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) software that can be deployed to help with financials, 
distribution, manufacturing, project management, and customer relation management. The 
enterprises that implement a vulnerability management process will experience a significantly 
less number of successful attacks. SAP has more than 320,000 customers in 190 countries, 
including more than 85% of the Fortune 2000 oil and gas companies. Oracle, which is used by 
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100% of the Fortune 100 companies, provides similar e-business enterprise platforms. ERP 
security is an important cog in the business management process. The IT security managers 
should regularly review all the connections, securing these connections whenever possible, and 
should not include open connections to the critical information systems within the organizations 
domain. 
1. Industrial Control Systems  
The industrial control systems (ICSs) use network connectivity to support the integration 
of hardware and software in distributed control systems, industrial automation and control 
systems, programmable automation controllers, control servers, intelligent electronic devices, 
and sensors. These systems are designed to be remotely controlled and, thus, link together time 
and place efficiently. Over time, technological developments have enabled these systems to 
become smarter by allowing remote access because data exchanges are made possible by internet 
connectivity via human–machine interfaces (HMI). Historically, the machines and related 
components used in industrial plants have employed computerized proprietary protocols, i.e., 
communication protocols owned by a single organization or individual. In fact, these dated 
machines lacked computing and communications technology. When compared to the modern 
advanced ICSs that can be controlled using wireless networks, such proprietary protocols kept 
these systems closed to external connectivity. 
The advantage of traditional proprietary protocols was that external threats did not exist 
because it was a closed or “air-gapped” system. The obvious advantage of the current IT systems 
is that they possess efficiencies that outperform any dated system; however, due consideration 
must be given to the external cyber threats. Even though it is logical to argue the benefits of 
operational and market efficiency outweighs the cost of dealing with cyberattacks, the threat of 
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them are considerably serious. As these technological inputs continue to develop, they present 
opportunities to improve the capability of the energy industry; however, they also inevitably 
enhance the technological capabilities of the cyber attackers. This makes it crucial to maintain a 
concurrent cybersecurity strategy that does not lose sight of or underestimate such threats. 
Massive amounts of throughput and continuity are required with respect to our coal and 
gas sectors to satisfy the aforementioned condition. The critical infrastructure of these sectors 
must be supported by ICSs that maintain a heightened level of cyber readiness. Maintaining this 
level of readiness can be a cumbersome task. Taking these systems down is not as simple as 
announcing a scheduled system outage, installing a patch, rebooting a server, and resuming 
normal operations. In addition, the ICSs are not similar to traditional home computers that can 
effortlessly deploy and update the anti-malware software. Further, malware was not considered 
when these systems were originally designed. Therefore, modern IT/OT integration requires 
robust security standards to prevent sabotage and industrial espionage. Additionally, these 
security practices must continue to evolve with the evolution of the threats.  
2. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems 
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are a subset of ICSs. The 
SCADA systems involve sophisticated software and hardware elements that allow industrial 
organizations to achieve the following: 
• ensure production safety at refineries; 
• control production processes locally and remotely;  
• monitor, gather, and process real-time data; 
• directly interact with devices, such as sensors, valves, pumps, motors, and other devices, 
via HMI; 
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• record events in a log file. 
The SCADA systems are essential for energy companies because they help to process data 
efficiently, thereby enabling smart decisions in real time, and communicate system concerns to 
mitigate interruptions. The programmable logic controllers and remote terminal units are 
microcomputers that transmit data to and from the sensors, end devices, and factory machines. 
These transmitted data are essential for plant managers and engineers to make important 
decisions. The corruption of these processes could be catastrophic if cyber attackers 
compromised the security of these systems. For example, if an attack resulted in a machine being 
unable to report a system malfunction to plant managers, product loss would occur and the 
damage would go undetected.  
Cybersecurity programs are based on market solutions as well as shared practices that 
continue to evolve with the emergence of new threats. The Oil and Natural Gas Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (ONG–ISAC) serves as a central point of coordination and 
communication to protect ONG exploration and production, transportation, refining, and delivery 
systems by analyzing and sharing trusted and timely cyber threat information, including the 
vulnerability and threat activity specific to the ICSs and SCADA systems. The mission of the 
ONG–ISAC is structured around the following four cornerstones: 
1. anonymous sharing; 
2. authenticated information sharing; 
3. industry-owned and -operated; 




Which is the Most Vulnerable Energy Source? 
Any energy source that is relied upon in an unrelenting manner is most at risk. 
America’s electrical power grid is certainly among the most vulnerable. It comprises more than 
200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, several thousand power plants, traditional and 
non-traditional electric utilities, and millions of electronic controls and computers routing these 
systems. Approximately 1,075 gigawatts of electrical power is distributed across one electric 
power grid consisting of three systems–the Eastern Interconnect, the Western Interconnect, and 
the Texas Interconnect. The computers managing this monumental task were designed in the 
1960s to integrate our power grid as a means to manage the generation, supply, and distribution 
of electricity. Over time, the complexity and sophistication of these systems have increased the 
efficiency of the industrial process; however, they have also become increasingly vulnerable and 
extremely difficult to secure. 
This correlates with critical coal and gas infrastructure because approximately 35% of 
the electricity is produced by the combustion of coal, whereas 27% of the electricity is produced 
by the combustion of natural gas. Further, 19% of the electricity is produced from nuclear power 
plants, which would be the most ecologically disastrous target if a terrorist attack was 
successfully executed. A nuclear power plant is a likely target for sabotage due to the potential 
impact; however, because of heavy operative protocols and security, nuclear power plants are not 
necessarily the most vulnerable. Regardless, attacks against any of these facilities would directly 
affect the electrical grid of our nations. 
Historically, the United States has enjoyed a geological and geographical position that 
has yielded a considerable competitive advantage with respect to the manner in which we 
produce, consume, and market the nation’s energy resources. The mobilization of the modern gas 
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industry in 1998 by Mitchell Energy in Texas allowed the United States to become a significant 
force during the unconventional gas revolution. America’s capacity to produce gas domestically 
has shielded us from foreign influence, minimizing the vulnerability of the nation’s critical 
infrastructures. As the production of natural gas in the U.S. continued to grow, our exporting 
facilities in the contiguous 48 states developed to satisfy the increased demand. In 2017, the 
United States became a net natural gas exporter, indicating that we export more amount of 
natural gas than the amount that we import (see Figure 1). In 2018, the U.S. natural gas exports 
doubled from that in 2017 for the first time in 60 years and have further continued to increase.  
Despite our advantageous natural gas position in the world, the U.S. has more than 
300,000 miles of inter- and intrastate transmission gas pipelines in addition to 2.1 million miles 
of distribution pipelines. These pipelines fuel our industry and heat our homes. Ensuring the 
cybersecurity of gas pipeline companies is a major enterprise risk, and their stakeholders seek to 
ensure that such risks are appropriately managed. Managing such risks involves protecting the 
use of the ICSs that control the pipelines. As mentioned previously, these interconnected systems 
are not only limited to the pipelines but are also utilized across the entire energy industry, 
including the coal plants. The heavy reliance on these pipelines to distribute gas across the 
country emphasizes the interdependency among our energy and transportation sectors.  
Midstream Vulnerabilities 
The gas pipelines lie underground, indicating that they are safer than the above-the-
ground systems. Multiple system backups and redundancies that enable failsafe environments 
secure the production, storage, and transportation of natural gas. LNG transportation is a precise 
process, where the natural gas is compressed and cooled to −260 °F. At this temperature, it 
becomes liquid and takes up only 1/600 of the space that it occupies in a gaseous state. This 
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indicates that it can be pumped into a specifically designed tanker, shipped long distances over 
water, and stored or re-gasified, fed into pipelines, and sent to consumers in global territories 
with independent laws and security postures. The aboveground risks must be well understood, 
managed, and mitigated. Despite the organization of the U.S. gas infrastructure, the disposition 
of a highly combustible commodity, such as natural gas, presents a target-rich environment for 
terrorists. Further, physical attacks and numerous plots have been both planned and perpetrated 
to achieve significant damage and disruption. 
 
CHAPTER	2:	DEFINING	THE	THREAT 
History of Threats and Attacks: Traditional vs. Cyber 
Extremists, eco-terrorists, and “hacktivists” have been determined to disrupt the 
transportation of gas and resort to sabotage to achieve their goals. In 2012, Anson Chi 
corresponded with Ted Kaczynski, the “Unabomber,” and unsuccessfully attempted to bomb a 
natural gas pipeline in Plano, Texas. In December 2010, eco-activists opposing the construction 
of two LNG pipelines in Virginia trespassed onto the property of an employee of the State Water 
Resources Control Board. A banner reading “Stop Poisoning Our Community” was subsequently 
hung, and these same activists communicated plots against the LNG export terminals along the 
U.S. coast on the “Anonymous Contributor” website. The anonymous author posted the 
following threatening message: 
“When we have done everything we can to prevent this pipeline with legal means, we 
will resort to sabotage and we will defeat this symbol of domination, exploitation, global capital, 
global pillage...” 
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Considering the amount of gas that the U.S. continues to import, disruption attacks 
against our geographic neighbors and trading partners would cause volatile supply disruptions 
and hinder free trade. Between October 2008 and July 2009, Canada’s natural gas pipelines in 
British Columbia were bombed six times by unknown eco-terrorists. These bombings were 
uniquely disturbing because these natural gases contained deadly concentrations of hydrogen 
sulfide. In 2013, Colombia’s FARC rebels bombed the rail line of Colombia’s largest coal 
exporter, decommissioning the train for four days. Incidentally, the exports were not impeded by 
this event because the company had sufficient stock at the port to continue exporting. 
To date, the most sophisticated cyberattack was Stuxnet, which was a virus developed by 
the U.S. and Israel to strike the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz in 2010. In 2014, other 
sophisticated attacks were successfully conducted when the hackers cut off a German steel mill 
operator’s ability to shut down its blast furnaces by taking control of the mill’s production 
software. The workers helplessly watched while the furnaces burned and destroyed the plant. In 
2012, an organized “spear-phishing” attack targeted the computer network of Saudi Arabia’s 
state-owned oil firm, Aramco, infecting 30,000 computers, which required weeks to contain. 
However, ultimately, this attack failed to achieve its objective, i.e., to disable Aramco’s ability to 
supply oil. In 1982, the Central Intelligence Agency allegedly planted a Trojan horse into the 
USSR’s Tran-Siberian Pipeline’s SCADA system to disable its pumps and compressors, which 
caused a massive 3-kiloton explosion. The construction of this pipeline was controversial 
because it delivered natural gas to Western Europe during the Cold War.  
Not all the cyberattacks are committed with intent to cause physical destruction. For 
example, some attacks are motivated by market fraud and corporate espionage. In 2014, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed charges against five Chinese military hackers for cyber-
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espionage against SolarWorld, a U.S. Corporation, for hijacking critical and sensitive 
manufacturing information. According to the DOJ, Chinese solar manufacturers “dumped” 
products into the U.S. markets at prices well below the fair value, stole thousands of files, 
including information on SolarWorld’s cash flow statements, manufacturing and production data, 
and privileged legal information related to the ongoing trade litigation.  
Top Ten Cybersecurity Threats 
 
How can attackers identify the systems used by their targets? All an attacker would have to 
do is to visit the website of a supporting vendor, such as Honeywell, read the press releases of 
past initiatives to identify the systems that have been implemented to formulate a strategy, and 
begin planning an attack. The following list identifies the top ten cybersecurity threats: 
1. Lack of awareness and training 
 
2. Remote work 
 
3. Using IT products with known weaknesses 
 
4. Limited cybersecurity culture 
 
5. Insufficient data network separation 
 
6. Insufficient physical security of the data rooms 
 
7. Software weaknesses 
 
8. Outdated control systems 
 
9. Onshore and offshore facility connections 
 











1. Gas Processing and Production  
 
Most of the gas processing is performed at the wellhead; however, the complete processing 
of natural gas is conducted at the processing plants. Much of the natural gas that we consume is 
primarily obtained from methane. Gas is easier to process when compared to processing and 
refining oil. Prior to delivering to the end user, natural gas must be separated and purified by 
removing ethane, propane, butane, and pentanes. There are four main processes involved in the 
removal of these impurities. 
1. Elimination of the oil and condensate 
2. Elimination of water 
3. Separation of the natural gas liquids 
4. Elimination of sulfur and carbon dioxide 
Scrubbers and heaters play a major role during the removal process. Scrubbers are designed 
to remove the particle impurities, and heaters ensure that the temperature of the gas does not 
become considerably low. These management systems are used in a variety of applications, 
including separators, tanks, heaters, incinerators, and flare stacks. These systems are designed to 
protect heaters from explosions. Conceptually, the fire triangle, which is obtained when the fuel 
or flammable materials are heated, is observed when the stored energy begins to react with the 
oxygen in the air, generating heat. This creates a vicious cycle that causes the fire to spread. To 
stop the spread of the fire, one of these elements should be eliminated to break this triangle. If an 
attacker was to gain control of the combustion or compression process and impede the ability to 
purge these systems, it could result in a deadly explosion, damaged equipment, and halted 
production.  
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Another management system that could be disastrous if its processes are compromised is the 
vibration-monitoring systems (VBSs). A VBS comprises wireless transmitters and sensors that 
provide intelligent monitoring and early detection of the damaged rotating machine parts. These 
systems directly impact a plant’s distribution of the product to the end users. A VBSs optimal 
performance is critical because they enable plants to maintain peak efficiency by preventing 
unplanned downtime, reducing maintenance costs, and improving reliability. Following the 
processing of natural gas, its storage can be just as vulnerable if compromised. In addition, the 
tank inventory systems control the commands that change any alarm affected by the gas’ level, 
temperature, and pressure.  
Fiscal Metering  
The flow computers facilitate fiscal metering, which involves custody transfer. Fiscal 
metering of gas involves a highly specialized process because gases are more difficult to measure 
when compared to liquids and are highly affected by the parameters of temperature and pressure. 
The ability of a flow computer to calculate the gas quantities based on these parameters are of 
paramount importance, and quantity measurement is imperative when upstream companies sell 
gas to midstream companies. Here, a small error could result in wastage of millions of dollars. 
The security measures for such computers make them extremely difficult to access; however, one 
should not underestimate the motivations of a disgruntled employee or an agent working for a 
hostile group or nation. These are not attacks in the traditional sense; when the production 
accounting systems can be manipulated to commit market fraud. 
Market Fraud 
How can hackers commit market fraud? Precise inventory levels are critical to a gas 
company’s economic viability, and even a slight error, e.g., a fraction of a percent, could result in 
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millions of dollars in losses. For example, the hackers could manipulate a company’s supply data 
by transmitting fake information to managers who make decisions based on this data. If these 
decision makers were deceived and ultimately exhausted their supply, their inability to deliver 
gas to customers and satisfy obligations could lead to changes in gas prices, resulting in huge 
losses that could possibly bankrupt the given company. By successfully installing malware, 
hackers can also manipulate stock figures, where systems, such as SAP, are used by deliberately 
understating the data about the stock of the affected companies to control the price of the stock. 
Such attacks can be achieved by exploiting SAP or Oracle Management plant connectivity 
applications that transfer data from the task management systems to the SAP systems.  
Coal Processing and Production  
Several methods are used during the coal extraction processes from both the surface and 
underground mines. Monumental labor efforts are involved in these processing plants to produce 
the final product. In surface mining, the ground covering the coal seam must be initially 
removed to expose the coal seam for extraction. Further, surface topography controls are 
employed in various surface mining methods, e.g., mining contour, area strip, or open-pit 
mining. The methods employed for loading, transporting, and storing coal are predominantly 
different. For example, contour mines are the most common in the hilly Appalachian terrain of 
the eastern United States where the overburden (see Figure 2), i.e., a material that lies above a 
coal seam, must be transported. Underground mining (see Figure 3) is observed when any ore 
body is a considerable distance below the surface, the amount of waste to be removed for 
obtaining the ore through surface mining is prohibitive, and underground techniques should be 
considered. 
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The functional processing involved in coal preparation is common among different 
plants. The sequences can be given as follows: 
1. crushing and breaking;  
2. sizing; 
3. storage and stockpiling; 
4. density separation; 
5. froth flotation; 
6. coal drying; 
7. refuse and tailings management. 
In 2017, approximately 757 million short tons of coal were produced in 24 states, among which 
five states produced approximately 538 million short tons (approximately 71% of the total U.S. 
coal production). The five largest coal-producing states (see Figure 4) with respect to the 
production in million short tons and their share of the total U.S. coal production in 2017 can be 
given as follows: 
• Wyoming (316.5 million short tons; 41% of the total U.S. coal production in 
2017) 
• West Virginia (92.8 million short tons; 12% of the total U.S. coal production in 
2017) 
• Pennsylvania (49.1 million short tons; 6% of the total U.S. coal production in 
2017) 
• Illinois (48.2 million short tons; 6% of the total U.S. coal production in 2017) 
• Kentucky (41.8 million short tons; 5% of the total U.S. coal production in 2017) 
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Cybersecurity Challenges in Mining  
To date, there have been no successful attacks against coal plants, resulting in damage or 
denial of services. The Trump administration and Department of Energy (DOE) suggest that 
coal’s security strengths compared to gas are related to cybersecurity due to the dispersed and 
exposed nature of the gas pipelines that feed power plants, leaving them difficult to defend. In 
contrast, it is physically difficult to penetrate coal plants. Some argue that although coal plants 
are easier to guard physically, they still have numerous digital networks and computer systems 
controlling heavy machinery that can be hacked.  
Generally, the IT security expenditures in mining are small when compared to other 
business expenditures. The processes have become computerized to promote efficiency relative 
to managing of company data, operations, and assets. However, the risk has increased because 
the use of such digital technologies has increased and they have become more interconnected. 
The use of process control networks (PCNs) to monitor and control industrial infrastructure and 
processes has become more common in the mining industry. PCNs communicate the commands 
and data between traditional control and measurement components as well as SCADA 
equipment. Historically, PCNs have been protected from hackers using the so-called “air gaps” 
that isolate them from unsecured networks and have been considered to be low risk from a 
cybersecurity perspective because they can only be accessed by onsite mining staff. However, 
this has subsequently changed. Today’s mining operations have become integrated into 
company-wide networks. These networks enable the employees to operate assets remotely to 
manage various functions, including the circulation and detection of flammable or harmful gases 
as well as machine temperature monitoring and controls. If these systems were to be hacked and 
sabotaged, an inability to control the systems could lead to injury and/or death, equipment 
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damage, cessation of production, and interruption in the supply of utilities. These forms of 
attacks can be committed from accidentally inserting a thumb drive containing malware to sights 
that are traditionally sealed off from outside networks. Highly sophisticated email or browser-
based attacks include phishing, Trojans, and worms.  
Distribution and Transportation 
The annual coal distribution report (ACDR) provides detailed information about U.S. 
domestic coal distribution according to the origin state, destination state, consumer category, and 
transportation method. The ACDR also summarizes a nation’s foreign coal distribution based on 
the coal-producing nation. Note that all the data for the 2017 report are final, current, and contain 
the following. 
• The total coal distribution for 2017 was 767.7 million short tons. 
• The distribution to foreign and domestic destinations was 767.8 million short tons. 
• Railroads moved approximately 68.6% of the domestic coal (see Figure 5), river barges 
accounted for 12.1%, trucks approximately 9.3%, and tramway, conveyor, and slurry 
pipelines accounted for 10.0%. Great lakes and tidewater pier transport modes accounted 
for less than 0.1% of the total shipments. 
• The electric power sector received approximately 92.5% of domestic distribution, 
whereas commercial, institutional, and industrial plants received the remaining 7.5%. 
• In 2018, U.S. coal exports were the highest in five years (see Figure 6). 
Freight Rail Security 
The transportation of coal by rail affects the communities through which the coal passes. 
For example, trains that haul coal temporarily block the roads, causing traffic congestion on 
major roadways that could potentially delay or otherwise impede emergency responders or 
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temporarily cut off residents from emergency services. Thus, a well-timed attack against a coal-
transporting train could be deadly. A national response to such terrorist attacks would be costly 
and further compound the success of these attacks. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and Department of Transportation (DOT) prescribed “voluntary” security practices for 
railway HAZMAT carriers, including scheduled training drills, criminal background checks on 
employees, and a designated liaison to the government emergency response agencies. Many 
believe that compliance with these security practices should be mandatory; however, the rail 
industry has claimed that these practices and preplanned responses in their training programs 
have been in place well before the government issued its recommendations. Following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the rail system identified its vulnerabilities and made significant changes to its 
operations. The rail system has the best safety record among that of any transportation method 
used in the United States. The 9/11 terrorist attacks continue to increase fears in American 
society, and subsequent attacks against the passenger rail systems in London, Madrid, and 
Mumbai have raised concerns about possible terrorist disruptions to the American freight rail 
transportation.  
Fuel on Hand 
Although efficient in minimizing the inventory holding costs, just-in-time delivery faces 
the risk of shortages when supply lines are disrupted. These supply lines can be exposed to both 
physical and cyber threats. Some argue that the benefit of “fuel on hand,” which means fuel 
sources, such as gas, that is stored onsite in substantial amounts will make fueled power plants 
more resilient in its response to a disruption caused by an attack. Others argue that the risk of 
stockpiling a highly combustible gas sensitive to temperature and pressure creates a considerable 
opportunity for failure and mishap. A recent announcement from the DOE stated that cyber and 
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physical threats could be mitigated at coal plants because they can store months of “fuel on 
hand” to survive supply disruptions that could not be mitigated by natural gas facilities because 
of their reliance on the pipeline networks. 
President Trump and Energy Secretary Rick Perry announced the halt of coal retirement 
to create a “strategic energy generation reserve” with the same intent as that of the U.S. 
Petroleum Reserve, which was created in 1973 in response to the 1970’s energy crisis. This crisis 
was caused by an oil embargo imposed by the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, which resulted in fuel shortages and excessive prices. The halting of coal 
retirement was further solidified in 2017 when President Trump signed an Executive Order (see 
Figure 7) directed at the Environmental Protection Agency to begin the complex and lengthy 
legal process of repealing the then President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (CPP). The CPP would 
have closed hundreds of coal-fired power plants, halted the construction of new ones, and 
replaced them with wind and solar farms.  
Proponents of the Trump administration’s move believe that the exposures to threats can 
be minimized if electric generation facilities can maintain coal and nuclear stockpiles onsite. In 
case of attack, the Energy Department would exercise emergency authority under a pair of 
federal laws, i.e., the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Federal Power Act, and order 
operators to purchase coal from at-risk facilities, which is an unprecedented intervention with 
respect to the energy markets. However, the opponents of the Trump administration’s move 
believe that federal intervention to rescue a dying industry will damage the energy market 
because it orders customers to purchase expensive electricity from designated power plants. The 
federal government centralizing its authority in any market would distort the demand signals and 
disrupt competition. I believe that our nation’s energy security is the most secure when diverse 
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means of power generation are available that serve as a contingency plan to protect our citizens 
in case of a disaster. 
 
CHAPTER	4:	CHALLENGES	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current and Potential Issues 
Although no actual cyberattack or physical attacks have succeeded against the U.S. gas 
and coal infrastructures, credible threats and attempts continue to occur. A successful attack 
against our energy infrastructure that result in instability or loss would leave our civilization in a 
state of panic, similar to the one our society witnessed during 9/11. This makes such threats more 
difficult to address for decision makers, especially because we cannot physically notice such 
threats and the types and methods of attacks. Unlike a physical attack, cyberattacks can cause 
immense damage before they are even detected. 
Private Industry and Government Cooperation 
From a legal perspective, there are no set reasonable standards of IT security compliance 
mandatory for a private enterprise to follow. This is largely because 80% of the energy 
infrastructure is owned and managed by the private sector. Regardless, there is some functional 
level of government cooperation with respect to energy security. The DOE provided technical 
assistance to help the states develop energy assurance and resiliency plans with support from the 
National Association of State Energy Officials.  
Cyber Readiness Funding, Legislation, and Policy 
Because of slow government action, the private sector has been forced to take 
cybersecurity seriously and is expected to spend more than $1 trillion on digital security globally 
through 2021; however, no specific figures were available with respect to energy sector 
spending. Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, the DOE 
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allocated $38 million in grants to assist states in developing plans designed to respond to the 
energy supply shocks, provide training to improve coordination between federal and state 
personnel, improve recovery and restoration capabilities, and address vulnerabilities. These plans 
are also designed to address supply disruptions to the nation’s energy resources, including 
electricity and natural gas, in response to the cybersecurity threats. 
In 2018, Rick Perry established the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and 
Emergency Response (CESER) at the DOE, and $96 million in funding for the office was 
included in President Trump’s fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget request to strengthen the DOE’s 
efforts related to cybersecurity and energy security. The creation of a CESER office will elevate 
the DOE’s focus on energy infrastructure protection and will enable coordinated preparedness 
and response to cyber, natural, and man-made threats. The DOE has announced $28 million in 
funding for 11 research partnerships, aiming to improve the technologies that combat 
cyberattacks. This funding will come from the CESER and fund four national laboratories and 
several large electric utilities as research partners. Although paling in comparison to private 
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